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OPINION 
_________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
The plaintiff, Aliments Krispy Kernels, brought this 
suit to enforce an arbitration award it received against the 
defendant, Nichols Farms, in a contract dispute.  The award, 
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based on an alleged breach of contract, was in the sum of 
$222,100.  Claiming that the parties never agreed to arbitrate, 
Nichols Farms did not attend the arbitration.  Aliments filed a 
petition to confirm the arbitration award and Nichols cross-
petitioned to vacate it.  The District Court denied Aliments’ 
petition to confirm and granted Nichols’s petition to vacate.  
Because we find that an issue of material fact exists as to 
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, we will vacate the 
District Court’s judgment and remand for further 
proceedings.   
 
I. Background 
 
In August 2012, Aliments, a Canadian snack purveyor, 
contacted its American broker, Sterling Corporation, to 
purchase thousands of pounds of raw pistachios.  Sterling, in 
turn, contacted Pacific/Atlantic Crop Exchange, another 
agricultural commodities broker.  Learning of Aliments’ 
interest in purchasing pistachios, Pacific called Nichols, a 
pistachio grower in California.  Nichols agreed to the 
proposed quantity and price.  One month later, in September 
2012, Sterling contacted Pacific with a second order of 
pistachios from Aliments.  Pacific reached out to Nichols 
once again.  Nichols agreed to the proposed quantity and 
price of this second order.   
 
To confirm the two orders, Sterling issued sales 
confirmations for the August and September orders and sent 
copies to Aliments and Pacific.  Pacific did not forward the 
Sterling sales confirmations to Nichols, however, and instead 
issued its own set of sales confirmations, which were sent to 
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Nichols and Sterling. 1  Neither Aliments nor Nichols was 
aware that two sets of sales confirmations existed.  The two 
sets contained the same terms, including a thirty-day credit 
term.  However, while Sterling’s sales confirmations 
contained arbitration clauses, it appears that some but not all 
of the sales confirmations generated by Pacific contained 
arbitration clauses.2 
 
Aliments evidently believed that the Sterling sales 
confirmations, though unsigned by either party, represented a 
binding contract to purchase pistachios from Nichols, on 
credit with payment due thirty days from delivery, “as 
usual.”3  Nichols, on the other hand, thought that the thirty-
day credit term was but a placeholder, as were all the terms in 
the Pacific sales confirmations except for the price and 
quantity terms.  In support, the president of Nichols submitted 
a declaration explaining that “[w]hen Nichols receives a 
request from a customer to purchase product on credit, [it] 
obtain[s] a credit report and then [he, the president of 
Nichols, is] the one who makes the decision about whether to 
                                                          
1 A 257-58 (Pacific never forwarded the sales confirmations 
from Sterling to Nichols because it is its business practice “to 
not forward to the seller unsigned confirmations.  Instead, [it] 
wait[s] to receive (and pass on) either a written purchase 
order or a signed confirmation from the buyer, which [it] then 
forward[s] to the seller, and/or a written contract or sales 
acknowledgement from the seller, reflecting a firm offer to 
purchase product.”); A 47 (president of Nichols declaring that 
he had never seen the Sterling sales confirmations). 
2 There is a dispute as to which versions of the sales 
confirmations were sent to Nichols and Sterling.  
3 A 101-02.  
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sell product on credit and on what terms and conditions.”4  
The president of Pacific corroborated this practice, and 
submitted a separate declaration, stating that he had no 
authority from Nichols “to commit to any credit terms or to 
bind Nichols to any credit terms.” 5  He avers that he created 
the sales confirmations based on a “template,” changing only 
the amount and price to reflect this particular transaction, 
leaving “product description, packaging, addresses, and 
terms” as-is from a prior transaction.6  “Based on [his] many 
years in the commodity brokerage business,” the president of 
Pacific “understood that Nichols, in response to [Aliments’] 
offer, had the right to perform a credit check on [Aliments], 
and require security or advance payment if it thought it to be 
necessary.”7   
 
After the sales confirmations were created, Nichols 
requested, and Aliments submitted, a credit application.  This 
credit application was denied due to Aliments’ previous late 
payments to Nichols, its involvement in a lawsuit with 
another farmer, and the increased difficulty of collection with 
any foreign corporation.  In short, Nichols would not deliver 
its pistachios until it received payment from Aliments first.   
 
Aliments protested that advance payment is a highly 
irregular request that is inconsistent with Nichols’s past 
practices with Aliments and with industry standards.  
Nonetheless, it continued to attempt to work with Nichols to 
come to an amiable resolution.  However, the parties were 
                                                          
4 A 45.  
5 A 74. 
6 Id.  
7 Id.   
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ultimately unable to come to an agreement on a payment 
method.  Finally, Aliments bought pistachios from another 
vendor at a higher price.  Seeking to recoup the extra cost, 
Aliments initiated arbitration proceedings in accordance with 
the arbitration clauses contained in the Sterling sales 
confirmations that were unseen and unsigned by Nichols.  
   
Despite being notified of the arbitration, Nichols 
elected not to attend.  Aliments was awarded $222,100 in 
damages against Nichols by the arbitration panel.  Sent a copy 
of this award, Nichols refused to satisfy it.  Finally, Aliments 
filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award in the District 
of New Jersey.  In response, Nichols cross-petitioned to 
vacate the arbitration award. 
 
After months of discovery, the District Court denied 
Aliments’ petition and granted Nichols’s cross-petition to 
vacate because no genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether the parties failed to enter into “an express 
unequivocal agreement” to arbitrate.8  We disagree, and for 
the reasons set forth below we will vacate and remand for 
further proceedings.9   
                                                          
8 A 9. 
9 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) and 9 U.S.C. § 9.  We have jurisdiction 
to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 9 U.S.C. 
§ 16(a).  “On appeal from a district court’s ruling on a motion 
to confirm or vacate an arbitration award, we review its legal 
conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.”  
Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 
2014) (emphasis added) (quoting Sutter v. Oxford Health 
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II. Discussion 
 
 On appeal, Aliments argues that the District Court 
made two legal errors: first, the Court “erred in using a legal 
standard requiring ‘an express unequivocal agreement’ to 
arbitrate prior to binding a party to arbitration”;10 and second, 
it erred in finding, as a matter of law, that the parties did not 
enter into such an agreement to arbitrate.  We will address 
each of these arguments in turn. 
 
 A.  Legal Standard 
 
  The parties’ dispute regarding the proper legal 
standard for determining whether the parties have made an 
agreement to arbitrate is the result of courts’ changing attitude 
towards the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).  In 1980, we 
held in Par-Knit Mills, Inc. v. Stockbridge Fabrics Co. that 
“[b]efore a party to a lawsuit can be ordered to arbitrate and 
thus be deprived of a day in court, there should be an express, 
unequivocal agreement to that effect.”11  In 1994, we 
reiterated this standard in Kaplan v. First Options.12  That 
case was appealed to the Supreme Court; and, in a decision 
affirming on other grounds, the Court held that, “[w]hen 
deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain 
matter . . . , courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-
                                                                                                                                  
Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. 
Ct. 2064 (2013)).   
10 Appellant’s Br. at 2 
11 636 F.2d 51, 54 (3d Cir. 1980). 
12 19 F.3d 1503, 1512 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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law principles that govern the formation of contracts.”13  
Though the Court’s holding appears to be a departure from 
our express and unequivocal standard, that standard was 
never expressly overruled. 
  
 Over a decade later, we reexamined the express and 
unequivocal standard in Century Indemnity Company v. 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London.14  We reviewed 
how we have used the express and unequivocal standard in 
the past, and acknowledged that the express and unequivocal 
language has been used, confusingly, to establish two 
different standards:  
 
On the one hand, we have stated the “express” 
and “unequivocal” requirement to explain that 
genuine issues of fact as to whether there is an 
agreement to arbitrate preclude compelling a 
party to submit to arbitration; on the other, we 
have used this language to state a substantive 
standard that applies to the determination of an 
arbitration agreement’s enforceability as a 
general matter.15  
 
In Century Indemnity, we held that the latter use of 
express and equivocal as a substantive standard is no longer 
valid after the Supreme Court’s decision in First Options of 
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan held that courts should generally look 
to the relevant state contract law to determine whether a valid 
                                                          
13 First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 
(1995).   
14 584 F.3d 513 (3d Cir. 2009). 
15 Id. at 530 (footnote omitted). 
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agreement to arbitrate exists.16  But we did not strike down 
the use of the express and unequivocal requirement to the 
extent that it “requires that there not be a genuine issue of 
material fact as to an arbitration agreement’s existence before 
a district court may determine whether the agreement exists 
as a matter of law.”17  Furthermore, in Century Indemnity, we 
repeatedly made clear that, despite the express and 
unequivocal language, “when determining whether there is a 
valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties . . . we apply 
ordinary state-law principles of contract law,” and no more.18   
 
 Here, the District Court clearly used the express and 
unequivocal standard to explain that it will decide the petition 
to confirm the arbitration award and motion to vacate as a 
matter of law only if there is no “genuine issue of fact 
concerning the formation of the contract.”19  Therefore, to the 
extent that the District Court meant to impose no more 
stringent standard on the arbitration agreement than that 
permissible under state law, it did not err.  However, 
Aliments’ confusion on this matter is understandable, and we 
recommend that district courts avoid using the “express and 
                                                          
16 Id. at 531 (citations omitted). 
17 Id. at 530.   
18 Id. at 532; see also id. at 531 (“When deciding whether the 
parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter . . . , courts 
generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that 
govern the formation of contracts.  The relevant state law 
here, for example, would require the court to see whether the 
parties objectively revealed an intent to submit the 
arbitrability issue to arbitration.” (quoting First Options, 514 
U.S. at 944)).    
19 A 10.  
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unequivocal” language.  The legal standard is simply that we 
apply the relevant state contract law to questions of 
arbitrability, which may be decided as a matter of law only if 
there is no genuine issue of material fact when viewing the 
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.20   
 
 Having established that the District Court, despite 
unclear language, used the correct standard, we turn next to 
Aliments’ second question on appeal: whether the District 
Court correctly determined that the parties did not enter into 
an agreement to arbitrate as a matter of law. 
 
 B.  Analysis 
 
 As previously stated, the ultimate inquiry of whether 
the parties agreed to arbitrate is governed by the applicable 
state law.  In this case, the question of which state law should 
apply is muddled.  Aliments is a Canadian company seeking 
to confirm an arbitration award issued in New Jersey by an 
arbitration panel that used New York law against Nichols 
Farms, a California company, for breach of a contract to 
deliver goods in California that was largely negotiated by a 
broker based in Georgia and a broker based in California.  
Before the District Court, Aliments argued for New York law 
to apply, and Nichols argued for California law to apply.  The 
District Court, however, made no findings about which state 
law applied.  Instead, based solely on general principles of 
contract law, it granted Nichols’s petition to vacate the 
                                                          
20 See Flintkote Co. v. Aviva PLC, 769 F.3d 215, 219-20 (3d 
Cir. 2014); In re Nortel Networks Inc., 737 F.3d 265, 270 (3d 
Cir. 2013); Invista S.A.R.L. v. Rhodia, S.A., 625 F.3d 75, 84 
(3d Cir. 2010).     
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arbitration award due to “a lack of evidence that any 
agreement or sales confirmation was ever entered,” and 
because “there is nothing to demonstrate that Nichols Farms 
intended to arbitrate the matter.”21  We disagree with this 
terse analysis.   
 
 Because we look to applicable state law to determine 
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, we begin with a 
choice-of-law analysis.  To determine the applicable state 
law, we use the forum state’s choice-of-law rule.  The first 
step in any choice-of-law inquiry under New Jersey law 
requires the court to determine whether there is an actual 
conflict between the laws of the potential forums.22  “That is 
done by examining the substance of the potentially applicable 
laws to determine whether there is a distinction between 
them.”23  If there is no actual conflict, “the inquiry is over 
and, because New Jersey would apply its own law in such a 
case, a federal court sitting in diversity must do the same.”24  
If there is an actual conflict, then the court must determine 
“which forum has the most significant relationship with the 
parties and the contract.”25  
  
                                                          
21 A 9. 
22 Maniscalco v. Brother Int’l (USA) Corp., 709 F.3d 202, 
206 (3d Cir. 2013). 
23 P. V. ex rel. T.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 962 A.2d 453, 460 (N.J. 
2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
24 Lebegern v. Forman, 471 F.3d 424, 428 (3d Cir. 2006).   
25 Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 
401 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Estate of Simmons, 417 A.2d 488, 491 (N.J. 1980)).  
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On appeal, the parties continue to rely on different 
state laws: Aliments relies on New York law and Nichols 
relies on New Jersey law.26  Both parties, however, agree that 
there is no actual conflict between New York law and New 
Jersey law.27  Consequently, we will apply New Jersey law on 
contract formation.   
 
Under New Jersey law, “[a]n enforceable agreement 
requires mutual assent, a meeting of the minds based on a 
common understanding of the contract terms.”28  A party who 
assents to a contract, however, is bound by all the terms of a 
contract, even those terms that the party did not read or 
specifically discuss.29  In addition to mutual assent, the New 
Jersey Uniform Commercial Code requires that “a contract 
for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more” be set 
forth in writing and “signed by the party against whom 
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker.”30  
But where the sales agreement is between merchants, the 
signature requirement is satisfied “if within a reasonable time 
a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against 
the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to 
know its contents,” and the receiving party does not give a 
                                                          
26 Appellant Supp. Ltr. Br. at 2; Appellee Supp. Ltr. Br. at 1.   
27 Appellant Supp. Ltr. Br. at 2; Appellee Supp. Ltr. Br. at 2.  
28 Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 137 A.3d 1168, 1180 (N.J. 
2016) (citing Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 99 A.3d 
306, 312-13 (N.J. 2014)).   
29 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 
84 (N.J. 1960). 
30 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-201(1).   
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“written notice of objection to its contents . . . within ten days 
after it is received.”31  
  
Here, neither party has persuaded us that, under New 
Jersey law, no issues of material fact exist as to whether the 
parties agreed to arbitrate.  We turn to appellant Aliments’ 
arguments first.  Aliments asserts that Nichols “clearly 
intended to be bound by the [Pacific sales confirmations] and 
never mentioned any dispute regarding the arbitration clause” 
contained therein.32  Specifically, Aliments points to evidence 
in the record suggesting that Nichols acted as though it were 
under a contractual obligation to sell the pistachios to 
Aliments.  For example, during the negotiations that took 
place in an effort to resolve their dispute, Nichols suggested 
that Aliments “void[] the existing purchase orders issued by 
Pacific Atlantic”33 and sign a new agreement with 
substantially similar sales terms but requiring pre-payment.  
Separately, in an internal email from the CEO of Nichols, the 
sales team was told to “delete the contract obligation.”34   
 
Aliments’ argument fails due to at least two issues of 
material fact.  First, as Nichols points out, there is a factual 
dispute as to whether the Pacific sales confirmations that were 
actually emailed to Nichols and Aliments contained 
arbitration clauses.35  The record contains versions of the 
Pacific sales confirmations that do include the arbitration 
                                                          
31 Id. § 12A:2-201(2).  
32 Appellant’s Br. at 18.  
33 A 210. 
34 A 213 
35 See Appellee Supp. Ltr. Br. at 3.   
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clauses,36 and versions that do not.37  Second, the record 
suggests that even though Nichols may have referred to the 
sales confirmations as “purchase orders” or “contract 
obligation[s],”38 that does not necessarily mean that Nichols 
viewed the Pacific sales confirmations as binding contractual 
agreements.  For example, Nichols’s Regional Sales Manager 
stated that it is his understanding that Nichols does not 
“accept” buyers’ offers to purchase until they pass a credit 
check.39  Indeed, after Nichols received the Pacific sales 
confirmations, it continued to request a credit application 
from Aliments.  Furthermore, the president of Pacific 
corroborated the fact that, to the best of his knowledge based 
on industry standards, the parties did not enter into a binding 
contract because neither party ultimately signed the sales 
confirmations.40  In sum, we cannot hold definitively that 
Nichols assented to binding sales agreements containing 
arbitration clauses.  
   
At the same time, Nichols’s arguments asking us to 
affirm the District Court’s grant of its petition to vacate the 
arbitration award also fail.  Nichols makes three categories of 
arguments.  First, it relies on the fact that neither party signed 
any of the sales confirmations and that the rules imposed by 
the Association of Food Industries, the chosen arbitrator, 
required “the presence of signatures by both parties.”41  This 
reliance is misplaced.  As reiterated above, under New Jersey 
                                                          
36 A 29; A 31. 
37 A 237; A 243.  
38 A 210; A 213.  
39 A 84. 
40 A 75.   
41 Appellee’s Br. at 11.  
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state law, bills of sale between two merchants need not be 
signed in order to be binding as long as certain other 
conditions are met.  The arbitrator’s own procedural rules, 
such as requiring both parties’ signatures, are to be decided 
by the arbitrator, rather than the court, unless otherwise 
provided for in the contract.42  The lack of signatures clearly 
did not prevent the arbitrator in this case from concluding that 
Aliments and Nichols entered into a binding sales contract, 
and that is not a conclusion that we have been asked to 
review.  Thus, our review is limited to examining whether, 
within the bounds of New Jersey state law, the parties made 
an agreement to arbitrate, and under New Jersey law, a lack 
of a signature in an agreement between two merchants is 
simply not dispositive. 
 
Second, Nichols argues that the Pacific sales 
confirmations “fail to satisfy the merchant’s exception to the 
general signature requirement”43 because they are not 
                                                          
42 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 
(2002) (While, generally, “a gateway dispute about whether 
the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a 
question of arbitrability for a court to decide . . . . 
[P]rocedural questions which grow out of the dispute and bear 
on its final disposition are presumptively not for the judge, 
but for an arbitrator, to decide.”(internal quotations and 
citations omitted)); see also BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of 
Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1207 (2014) (“[C]ourts presume that 
the parties intend arbitrators, not courts, to decide disputes 
about the meaning and application of particular procedural 
preconditions for the use of arbitration.”).   
43 Appellee Supp. Ltr. Br. at 4.  
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writings “in confirmation of the contract[s].”44  Specifically, 
Nichols argues that the Pacific sales confirmations fail 
because they “bear blank signature lines for the buyer and 
seller and still require sales confirmation numbers from 
Nichols Farms.”45  We disagree with Nichols’s proposition 
that these deficiencies rendered the Pacific sales 
confirmations incomplete as a matter of law where the sales 
confirmations included all the essential terms of a sales 
contract: price, quantity, delivery, and payment method.46   
                                                          
44 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-201(2).   
45 Appellee Supp. Ltr. Br. at 4.   
46 Cf. Berg Agency v. Sleepworld-Willingboro, Inc., 346 A.2d 
419, 422 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (“[P]arties may 
effectively bind themselves by an informal memorandum 
where they agree upon the essential terms of the contract and 
intend to be bound by the memorandum, even though they 
contemplate the execution of a more formal document.”).  
Nichols also argued that we should not address any arguments 
relying on the Pacific sales confirmations because “Aliments 
did not rely on the [Pacific] sales confirmations in its petition 
to confirm” before the District Court.  Appellee’s Br. at 12.  
This is simply a misrepresentation of the facts.  Aliments, in 
its original petition to confirm arbitration award, specifically 
referenced, and attached, the Pacific sales confirmations as 
bases for confirming the award.  Mem. of Law in Support of 
Petition to Confirm Final Arbitration Award, Aliments Krispy 
Kernels v. Nichols Farms, No. 3:13-cv-5995 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 
2013), ECF No. 1-1.  There may, however, exist a question as 
to whether the Pacific sales confirmations satisfy the 
merchant’s exception to the general statute of frauds as 
writings “in confirmation of the contract[s]” because they 
may not sufficiently make reference to prior oral agreements.  
 17 
 
Third and last, Nichols argues that the merchant’s 
exception does not apply because Nichols “advised [Pacific] 
before and after the confirmations issued that it wanted 
payment terms not reflected therein and, the day before the 
second confirmation, told [Pacific] to have ‘[its] buyer’ 
comply with the terms Nichols Farms wanted.”47  The 
merchant’s exception applies to unsigned written 
                                                                                                                                  
See Trilco Terminal v. Prebilt Corp., 400 A.2d 1237, 1240 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (holding that the merchant’s 
exception in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-201(2) is satisfied only 
if the written confirmation indicates “that a binding or 
completed transaction has been made”).  Nichols did not 
make this argument, however, and has thereby conceded that 
the Pacific sales confirmations sufficiently reference a prior 
oral agreement between the parties.  Moreover, New Jersey’s 
interpretation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-201(2) is in direct 
conflict with New York’s interpretation of the same Uniform 
Commercial Code provision.  In Bazak International Corp. v. 
Mast Indus., Inc., 535 N.E.2d 633, 636 (N.Y. 1989), the New 
York Court of Appeals explicitly “reject[ed] the exacting 
standard proposed by Trilco and Norminjil [a subsequent 
federal case applying Trilco] as inconsistent with the letter 
and spirit of the relevant UCC sales provisions.”  Instead, the 
Court of Appeals held that written confirmations are 
sufficient to satisfy the merchant’s exception so long as “they 
afford a basis for believing that they reflect a real transaction 
between the parties.”  Id. at 638.  Here, Nichols explicitly 
conceded that “there is no conflict between the applicable 
New York and New Jersey rules,” and so we can only 
surmise that Nichols does not wish to apply Trilco to this 
case.  Appellee Supp. Ltr. Br. at 1.   
47 Appellee Supp. Ltr. Br. at 7. 
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confirmations “unless written notice of objection to [their] 
contents is given within ten days after [they are] received.”48  
Nichols posits that its repeated requests for Aliments to 
complete a credit application satisfy, as a matter of law, the 
exception to the exception.  We cannot so find because the 
record before us lacks evidence of any written notice of 
objection.  Instead, we have an email from Nichols to Pacific, 
dated one day before the September Pacific sales 
confirmation was sent, requesting Pacific to “remember to 
send the credit application to [its] buyer at the same time [it] 
sends [Nichols] the P[urchase] O[rder].”49  In deposition 
testimony, the president of Nichols stated that he assumes that 
“there would either have been something in writing or 
something over the phone” to inform Pacific that, though 
Nichols had agreed to the quantity and price as reflected in 
the sales confirmations, it did not agree to sell the pistachios 
on credit with payment due in 30 days.50  He then added that 
“[q]uite often it’s done verbally.”51  However, he also 
testified that there was correspondence “from the beginning 
of August into the end of November about Aliments [and] the 
credit process with Aliments,” suggesting that, perhaps, there 
may have been writings between the parties but it is not clear 
from this testimony that any of them embody the “written 
objection” required under New Jersey law.52  In short, there 
remains an issue of material fact as to whether Nichols sent a 
written notice of objection regarding the Pacific sales 
confirmations within ten days after they were received. 
                                                          
48 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-201(2).  
49 A 89.   
50 A 183. 
51 Id.   
52 A 184. 
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*  *  * 
 
 In sum, contrary to the District Court’s analysis that 
there is “a lack of evidence that any agreement or sales 
confirmation was ever entered,” we find that multiple issues 
of material fact exist, precluding us from entering judgment 
in favor of either party.53  
                                                          
53 A 9. 
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III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate and remand 
to the District Court for further proceedings.   
